We study whether group identity helps mitigate inefficiencies associated with appropriable quasi-rents, which are often created by relationship-specific investments in bilateral trade relationships. Based on previous findings that group identity strengthens other-regarding preferences, we conjecture that group identity reduces agents' incentives to undertake ex-post opportunistic behavior such as investment in an outside option. Our experimental results, however, do not support this conjecture, and contrast with our previous experimental findings that group identity mitigates the hold-up problem associated with distortion in relation-specific investment. We discuss a possible cause of the difference, and its implications for the theory of the firm.
Introduction
In bilateral trade relationships, relation-specific investment often creates appropriable quasirents (AQRs hereafter), where the value of trade within the relationship exceeds the value of outside trading opportunities. AQRs open up possibilities for socially inefficient actions (or opportunistic behavior) when contracts are incomplete. How can this inefficiency be resolved or mitigated? In the theory of the firm literature, integration between two parties has been studied intensively as a remedy for the problem (see Whinston, 2003 and Gibbons, 2005 for excellent discussions of this literature).
In our exploration of this important research question in the economic study of organizations, we focus on group identity, a central concept in social psychology, and test whether it could serve as a contributing factor in mitigating inefficiencies resulting from the existence of AQRs. According to investment (underinvestment) . 1 In the current paper, we focus on the other type of inefficiency and study how group identity affects ex-post opportunistic behavior. Inefficiency in our current setup stems from unproductive investment in an outside option (overinvestment).
As we point out in MS, one of the key contributions of the property-rights theory was that it gave a unified account of the costs and benefits of integration (Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Gibbons, 2005) . In reality, however, incentives for relation-specific investment are provided by a variety of means, of which ownership is but one, as argued by Holmström and Roberts (1998) . The present paper and MS together contribute to the theory of the firm literature by studying group identity, which is present under integration, as a factor that can influence incentives for ex-ante relation-specific investment and ex-post opportunistic behavior. 2 The existing economics literature provides evidence that group membership can affect people's choices in both non-strategic and strategic environments (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000 , 2002 , 2005 , 2008 Basu, 2005 Basu, , 2010 Benabou and Tirole, 2011; Chen and Chen, 2011) . 3 Crucial for our deliberations, Chen and Li's (2009) experiment shows that induced group identity affects otherregarding preferences -the underlying mechanism on which our conjecture that group identity mitigates the inefficiencies related to the existence of AQRs hinges. Our contribution to this literature is derived from applying the idea of group identity to the theory of the firm and especially from focusing on the importance of group identity in a particular strategic environment of haggling over AQRs. To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous experimental research, apart from MS, that studies the effects of group identity on inefficiencies associated with relation-specific investment.
4
1 Although the main focus of the incomplete contracting literature on ex-ante relation-specific investment is underinvestment, overinvestment can also play important roles in the choice of the optimal governance structure (see, for example, Hart, 2003; Schmitz, 2012; Hoppe, Kusterer, and Schmitz, 2013) . Hoppe, Kusterer, and Schmitz (2013) experimentally study predictions based on Hart's (2003) theoretical framework, which compares two modes for provision of an infrastructure-based public service. In a public-private partnership (PPP), the two tasks of building the infrastructure and operating it are delegated to one private contractor, whereas, under traditional procurement (TP), these tasks are delegated to separate contractors. Hoppe, Kusterer, and Schmitz consider a parameterization in which PPP is preferable to TP where PPP resolves underinvestment on one kind of investment at the cost of overinvestment in the other kind, and find support for the theoretical prediction in their laboratory experiment. Their experiment does not incorporate group identity or other-regarding preferences.
2 See Section 2 of MS for a brief summary of the theory of the firm literature. 3 For a review of the experimental economics literature on group identity, see MS. A detailed review of the social psychology literature on group identity can be found in Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) , Chen and Li (2009), and McDermott (2009) . 4 In parallel to our research agenda, Boulu-Reshef (2013) discusses how the literature on identity can enhance the notion of social context in the theory of the firm literature. She then proposes an approach to improve our understanding of the relationships between the questions that are related to the firm and those that are related to identity. In this interesting conceptual paper, no experimental results or economic theoretical frameworks are presented.
Theoretical framework and hypothesis
Investment in an outside option is an important example of ex-post opportunistic behavior, as pointed out, for instance, by Klein et al. (1978) , who argue that in bilateral trade between a printing press company and a publisher, the publisher may decide to invest in the outside option by holding its own standby press facilities in order to increase its bargaining position against the printing press company. 5 We incorporate the opportunistic behavior of investing in an outside option into the following simple interaction between a seller and a buyer. A potential gain from trade between the seller and the buyer, denoted by G, is available, where G is interpreted as AQRs. The agents interact in three stages. In Stage 1, before the buyer makes a price offer, the seller decides whether to invest in an outside option at the cost F in case he later rejects the buyer's offer. If the seller invests, then his outside option is X, where G > X > F. If the seller does not invest, then his outside option is 0. In Anticipating this, the seller will invest in the outside option in Stage 1 because X > F. The seller's investment is opportunistic in the sense that it increases the seller's payoff from 0 to X by effectively reducing the buyer's payoff from G to G -X. The investment is inefficient because it adds no value to the seller's trade with the buyer, yet the buyer incurs the cost of investment, thereby reducing the total surplus. A key assumption in the transaction cost economics is that such inefficient, opportunistic behavior can be prevented or mitigated by vertical integration (with resulting bureaucratic costs). And a key hypothesis in the transaction cost economics is that larger returns from opportunistic behavior make integration more likely (see Klein et al., 1978; Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005 We derive our hypothesis based on the logic of Revealed Altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) , which has been quite successful in predicting outcomes in various experimental settings testing for the presence and nature of other-regarding behavior (see Appendix B for a more detailed summary). In particular, we conjecture that the buyer views the seller's choice of noninvestment as a generous action. If the seller invests in the outside option and rejects any offers lower than the outside option, the buyer must offer at least p = X, reducing the buyer's maximum payoff from G to G -X. The seller's non-investment means that the seller chooses not to establish the outside option X and hence not to reduce the buyer's maximum payoff, even though the seller has an option to do so. In this sense, the seller's non-investment is generous to the buyer.
One of the two axioms of Revealed Altruism theory (Axiom R), applied to our setup, predicts that the seller's generous action of not investing in the outside option increases the buyer's altruistic preferences towards the seller. This implies that p NI is greater than Z. If agents are self-regarding, the seller will be better off by investing because p I -p NI = X + Z -p NI > F holds since Z = p NI = 0 under self-regarding preferences. In the presence of other-regarding preferences, however, X > F does not necessarily imply p I -p NI > F because p NI can be greater than Z, and hence the seller will not necessarily be better off by investing. In fact, in Morita and Servátka (2014), we experimentally investigate this setup with G = 100, F = 10, and X = 25, 35, and 65, and find p NI to be significantly greater than Z in all treatments. Furthermore, the data show that, on average, the seller is worse off by investing when X = 25 and 35. 7 We postulate that group identity strengthens agents' other-regarding preferences, which in turn reduces their incentives to undertake ex-post opportunistic behavior. In our setup, this conjecture is translated into the following hypothesis. 
Experiment design and procedures
The experiment took place in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury, with 228 undergraduate students serving as subjects. The participants were selected randomly from the NZEEL database using the ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner, 2004 ). An experimental session lasted 60 minutes on average, including the initial instruction period and the payment to subjects. The subjects earned an average of NZD 14.69 (New Zealand dollars) from the game, a NZD 5 show up fee, and, on average, NZD 3.54 for correctly answered questions about trivia in the Same-Team and Different-Team treatments.
In order to create strong group identity, we followed the procedure successfully introduced in MS. 8 Upon entering the laboratory, all subjects were randomly divided into the Orange and Yellow teams, based on the color of the paper they drew from a large manila envelope. The subjects were 8 Most of the experimental research in psychology that focuses on testing various aspects of social identity theory (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) employs the so-called minimal group paradigm of inducing a group identity in a laboratory setting. A minimal group consists of people who share only one social category and who have no social interaction. There are four criteria for a group to be minimal: 1. Random assignment based on a trivial criterion; 2. No social interaction; 3. Anonymous membership; and 4. No interdependence of interests (i.e., the decision task requires no link between the decision-maker's payoffs and his choices). The criterion for categorizing subjects into groups is therefore often trivial, such as a preference for Klee's or Kandinski's paintings or a tendency to overestimate or underestimate the number of dots on a screen. The minimal group paradigm was introduced by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) , who observed that categorization alone was sufficient to generate in-group favoritism. Two competing explanations, social categorization (Tajfel and Turner, 1986 ) and expectations of generalized reciprocity among in-group members (Yamagishi, Jin and Kiyonari, 1999; Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000) , have emerged as potential mechanisms causing in-group favoritism. Most economic experiments violate the fourth criterion.
then seated in cubicles, in the respective color rows. They were free to choose any seat within their rows. The experimenters then handed subjects their team-color t-shirts, representing team uniforms, and asked everyone to put them on. The subjects were also told they could keep their t-shirts after the experiment was over. Next, the teams were asked to stand up and verify that all their teammates were wearing the same color t-shirt.
Our experiment included three treatments in total: the Same-Team and Different-Team treatments were based on the pairing of subjects; in the Baseline treatment, there were no teams and therefore no group identity. The treatments were implemented in an across-subjects design in which each subject participates in one treatment only. Each of the first two treatments consisted of two tasks: (1) answering two questions about trivia; and (2) playing the one-shot bargaining game. In the Baseline treatment, subjects only played the bargaining game.
The two tasks were implemented as follows. The subjects were first given instructions to complete Task 1, which involved answering two questions about trivia. The instructions were projected on a screen and read aloud. Prior to answering the questions, the subjects were given the opportunity to communicate via online chat (programmed and conducted with z-Tree; Fischbacher, chat with all remaining subjects in the Yellow Team. After the chat was over, all subjects individually submitted their answers. The purpose of this task was to strengthen group identity (see Yamagashi and Kiyonari, 2000; Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Chen and Li, 2009; and Chen and Chen, 2011) . Since in the Baseline treatment there were no teams, we decided not to include this task either because it could create a sort of group identity among the subjects participating in the same session.
Note that the objective of the current design was to create a sufficiently strong group identity to test our research question, not to separate out the effects of wearing the same color t-shirts on subject behavior. This other question is explored in detail in MS.
Our experimental design thus included three key features to induce group identity:
categorization of subjects into either the Yellow Team or Orange Team, usage of t-shirts representing team uniforms, and cooperation to achieve the same goal -answering questions about trivia. As discussed in MS, these are important means through which group identity is created and strengthened when two parties are integrated within the same organizational boundary. 9 Note that the 9 Social psychology research shows that symbols, such as uniforms, reinforce group identity and enhance cooperation among in-group members by differentiating them from out-group members. Uniforms provide a clear way of identifying group boundaries and thus allow for achieving the benefits of cooperation without the risk of excessive costs by limiting conjecture that we tested in the experiment hinged crucially on a strong identification with the team.
Therefore, we did not follow the minimal group paradigm but rather strove to create a group identity that was sufficiently strong to answer our research question.
In the instructions for Task 1, subjects were told they would be paid NZD 3 for each correct answer, but would not find out the results until the end of the experiment. This was done to control for the level of created group identity that could vary in the event that an individual received poor advice from a team member. Once all subjects answered both questions, the experimenters collected their answer sheets.
Next, neutrally framed instructions for Task teams. In all treatments, it was emphasized that no participant would learn the identity of the paired person and that the experimenters would keep track of all decisions using ID numbers.
In the instructions, the subjects were informed that their earnings would be denoted in experimental currency referred to as tokens, and at the end of the experiment exchanged into dollars using the following exchange rate: 1 token = NZD 0.30. The instructions explained that within each pair, one person was going to be randomly assigned to be the seller (referred to as the 'First Mover' in the instructions) and the other person to be the buyer (the 'Second Mover'). The seller started the experiment with an endowment of 10 tokens and the buyer with 0 tokens.
The decisions were divided into three stages. In Stage 1, the seller had to decide whether to invest his 10 tokens in order to create an outside option of X tokens for himself in case he later rejects the buyer's offer made in Stage 2. If the seller invested, then his outside option was 25 tokens.
If the seller did not invest, then his outside option was 0 tokens, but he got to keep the initial 10 tokens. In Stage 2, 100 tokens were made available to be split between the pair. The buyer decided how much out of the 100 tokens to offer to the seller. The buyer got to keep the remainder only if the seller accepted the offer.
altruistic behavior towards in-group members. Social psychologists describe an in-group as a bounded community of mutual and depersonalized expectations of cooperation. Such expectations motivate adherence to in-group norms and promote behavior that ensures that one is recognized as an in-group member (Brewer, 1981 (Brewer, , 1999 .
We used the strategy method (Selten, 1967) to elicit buyers' behavior. Therefore, the buyer was not notified of the seller's investment decision until the end of the experiment and made an offer for both of the two possible scenarios, i.e., one if the seller had invested and his outside option was 25 tokens and the other if the seller had not invested and his outside option was 0 tokens. 10 The two scenarios were presented to each buyer by the software in a random order. In Stage 3, the seller learned about the offer (either following investment or non-investment, depending on his own Note that, this way, both subjects made exactly two decisions. Asking the seller to accept/reject an offer in the counterfactual case (i.e., asking the seller who invested to accept/reject an offer following non-investment or vice versa) would be quite unintuitive and could possibly lead to confusion. Also, asking the seller to provide a full strategy would be burdensome and time consuming and could potentially dilute his attention to the decision that truly mattered for his payoffs.
The parameterization of the game is presented in Figure 1 . This game tree was not shown to the subjects.
Figure 1. The game
In order to aid and verify subjects' understanding of this three-stage game, we included four control questions (provided in Appendix A along with subject instructions and questions about trivia), which all participants had to answer correctly before proceeding to the decision-making part.
While the subjects were answering the control questions, the experimenters privately answered any questions and, if necessary, provided additional assistance and explanation until the subject calculated all answers correctly. Then, the four scenarios were reviewed publicly by the experimenter and correct answers were projected on the screen. During the decision-making part, the buyers had on their screens a calculator that would display their as well as their paired seller's payoffs following acceptance and rejection for any offer they decided to input. At the end of the session, the subjects were asked to complete a short, post-experiment questionnaire. Upon completion, all subjects were privately paid their earnings for the session. The average offer is averaged over the decisions of all buyers due to the strategy method. The average accepted offer following investment (non-investment) is averaged only over the accepted offers by the sellers who actually chose to invest (not to invest). The average rejected offer is calculated analogously. In line with our previous results, the Mann-Whitney tests, reported in the second row of Table 2 , find no difference in buyers' offers following non-investment (presented graphically in These results are robust to using accepted offers only (the respective p-values are 0.274, 0.324, and 0.956).
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12 Note that we are not assuming that in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination are additive. Our data also allow us to study the effect of group identity on the buyer's offer following investment (p I ). We find no statistical difference in p I (graphically presented in Figure 2b 
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Impacts of group identity: Ex-ante relation-specific investments vs. ex-post opportunistic behavior
We postulate that group identity strengthens agents' other-regarding preferences, which in turn reduces their incentives to undertake ex-post opportunistic behavior. Our experimental results, however, do not support our hypothesis that inefficient investment in the outside option is less likely under group identity and more likely in the absence of group identity. This is in contrast to the findings presented in MS. In that paper, we postulate that group identity strengthens agents' other-regarding preferences, which helps mitigate distortion in ex-ante relation-specific investments. In the MS experiment, the seller decides whether or not to invest F. If no investment is made, the game ends. If the seller invests, G (> F) is made available to be split between the seller and the buyer. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of p to split G. The seller can receive p by accepting the offer, in which case the buyer receives G -p. If the seller rejects the offer, G disappears and neither party receives any money. 13 In this 'hold up game', the seller does not invest if he and the buyer have self-regarding preferences, leading to inefficiency (because investment is the joint-surplus maximizing decision given G -F > 0). The seller may, however, choose to invest in the presence of other-regarding preferences. In order to create group identity, we follow the procedure explained in Section 2 of the present paper. 14 We hypothesize that the seller is more likely to invest in the Same-Team treatment because the induced group identity between the seller and the buyer strengthens his altruistic preferences, giving the seller, in turn, higher incentives to invest. Findings from our MS experiment support this hypothesis and, at the same time, they demonstrate that the procedure used in both papers is capable of inducing a strong group identity.
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A possible cause of the difference between the present paper's result and MS' result is the different reaction to an act of commission than to an act of omission. In MS, the seller's investment (an act of commission) is a generous action, whereas, in the present paper, the seller's noninvestment (an act of omission) is a generous action. Axiom S of Revealed Altruism theory states that an individual's generous action increases another agent's altruism more strongly when the generous action overturns the status quo (such action is then an act of commission) than when it upholds the status quo (an act of omission). 16 In line with the spirit of this axiom, our findings suggest a possibility that group identity increases the effect of the seller's generous action on the buyer's altruism when the generous action is an act of commission, but group identity has no such effects when the generous action is an act of omission.
More generally, in the context of the theory of the firm, our findings yield a hypothesis that group identity could be effective in inducing agents to make ex-ante efficient, relation-specific investments, but ineffective in preventing agents from taking ex-post opportunistic actions. We 13 In MS, F = NZD 10 and G = NZD 14. 14 Apart from the obvious differences in the games used in the two experiments, there are a couple of minor differences in the associated experimental procedures, which, however, are unlikely to have caused the different results: (i) in MS, the subjects were paid NZD 2 per correct answer in Task 1, whereas in the current paper it was NZD 3. This change was introduced in order to increase the average subject earnings due to the change in laboratory policy regarding the target average payment, which has increased from NZD [14] [15] [16] (ii) in MS, the payoffs were in NZD, whereas in the current paper we used tokens with a set exchange rate into NZD; and (iii) the MS experiment was handrun and buyers' behavior was elicited using the direct-response method, whereas the current experiment was computerized and buyers' behavior was elicited using the strategy method. 15 In MS, we find that being on the same team as opposed to being on different teams increases the investment rate from 25.9% to 43.8% and the buyer's average offer from NZD 8.74 to NZD 10.38 . Both treatment differences are statistically significant (p = 0.036 and 0.012, respectively). 16 The status quo refers to the original budget set available to the buyer before the seller's decision. For details, see Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) and Cox, Servátka, and Vadovič (2014) . In the current experiment the status quo is implied by the wording in subject instructions that state that the seller decides whether or not to invest his/her endowment of 10 tokens.
believe that further investigating this hypothesis in a variety of setups is a meaningful direction of future research because of the two implications it would yield for the theory of the firm.
The first implication is based on the idea that group identity is created when two parties are integrated within the same organizational boundary. Regarding ex-ante efficient, relation-specific investments (a focus of the property-rights theory), the hypothesis suggests that group identity is a mechanism, complementary to other mechanisms such as property rights, through which integration helps mitigate distortion in such ex-ante investments. In contrast, regarding ex-post opportunistic behavior (a focus of the transaction cost economics), it suggests that group identity does not play a major role in preventing ex-post opportunism through mergers.
The second implication is based on the idea that a merger between agents is not the only way how to create group identity between them. For example, Toyota Motor Corporation formed an association, called Kyoho-kai, of its first-tier suppliers with three purposes: (i) information exchange between the member firms and Toyota; (ii) mutual development and training among the member firms; and (iii) socialization (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) . Toyota has succeeded in creating a dense network with a strong identity and cooperative knowledge-sharing routines (Wilhelm and Kohlbacher, 2011) . Such associations exist at all eleven Japanese automobile manufacturers except for Honda (Sako, 1996) . 17 The hypothesis therefore implies that creating group identity between agents without merging them can be a way, alternative to mergers, to mitigate distortions in ex-ante efficient, relation-specific investment. In contrast, such a method would not work for ex-post opportunistic behavior. 18 Creating and strengthening group identity in everyday-life contexts requires significant costs, and hence it is important to identify the kinds of inefficiency that group identity can and cannot resolve or mitigate.
Summary and conclusion
Inefficiency associated with AQRs is a critical element of the theory of the firm, where two main sources of the inefficiency are ex-post opportunistic behavior and distortions in ex-ante investments. This paper studies investment in an outside option as an important example of ex-post opportunistic behavior. Based on previous experimental findings that group identity strengthens agents' altruistic preferences towards group members, we conjecture that group identity reduces 17 Outside Japan, Toyota started an association with its U.S. suppliers in 1989 (Dyer and Hatch, 2006) . 18 Dyer and Ouchi (1993) find that the Japanese suppliers are willing to invest in customized equipment and customerspecific human capital, and locate their plants quite close to the manufacturer (see also Nishiguchi, 1994 and Dyer, 1996 for related findings). These findings are consistent with the implication that creating group identity between agents mitigates distortion in ex-ante efficient, relation-specific investment.
agents' incentives to invest in an outside option. Our experimental findings, however, do not support our conjecture in the implemented setting. This is in contrast to the findings presented in MS. In that paper, our experimental findings show that group identity strengthens agents' other-regarding preferences, which mitigates distortions in ex-ante, relation-specific investments. Following the Revealed Altruism theory, we have discussed a possible cause of the difference based on the idea that the seller's more generous choice is an act of commission in MS's setup, whereas it is an act of omission in the present paper's setup. Our findings in the present paper and MS together yield a hypothesis that group identity could be effective in inducing agents to make ex-ante efficient relation-specific investments, but ineffective in preventing agents from taking ex-post opportunistic actions. We discuss two new implications for the theory of the firm that arise from the hypothesis, making us believe that further exploration of this hypothesis is a promising avenue for future research.
TASK 1 DECISIONS [All treatments]
Please answer the following two trivia questions. For each correct answer, you will be rewarded with $3. You can also use a team chat program to get help from or offer help to other members on your own team. 
Task 2 Earnings
Your Task 2 earnings will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of others. The earnings will be denoted in experimental currency referred to as tokens. Upon completion of the experiment, all tokens will be exchanged into dollars using the following exchange rate: 1 token = $0.30. Notice that the more tokens you earn, the more dollars you will receive. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Anonymity
Each person from the Yellow Team will be randomly paired with another person from the Yellow Team. Each person from the Orange Team will be randomly paired with another person from the Orange Team. No one will learn the identity of the person (s)he is paired with. Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during or after the experiment.
Pairing and Roles
Within each pair, one person is going to be randomly assigned to be the First Mover and the other person to be the Second Mover. 100 tokens are made available to be split between the First and the Second Mover. The 100 tokens are split only if the First Mover accepts the Second Mover's offer but the 100 tokens disappear if the First Mover rejects. The First Mover starts the experiment with 10 tokens. The Second Mover starts the experiment with 0 tokens. The decisions are divided into three stages: Note that the First Mover's decision will determine which decision of the Second Mover will be relevant. Therefore, please think about your decisions carefully.
Stage 3: The First Mover's Acceptance/Rejection The First Mover learns about the offer, and either accepts it or rejects it.
 If the First Mover accepts the Second Mover's offer, the 100 tokens is split according to the offer. The outside option is irrelevant in this case. 
Payment of Experimental Earnings
Once all participants have made their decisions, you will be shown a summary of your payoffs from Task 2. Then you will be asked one by one to approach the experimenter in the room in the back of the lab for the payment of your experimental earnings from both tasks. Are there any questions?
ordering B if the buyer's willingness to pay to increase the seller's payoff in situation A is greater than or equal to his willingness to pay in situation B.
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Revealed Altruism theory postulates that an individual's preferences can become more or less altruistic depending on the choices of another agent. Axiom R (for reciprocity) states that if the seller provides a more (less) generous opportunity set to the buyer, then the buyer's preferences will become more (less) altruistic towards the seller. In our setup, when the seller invests in the outside option, he provides a less generous opportunity set to the buyer (F X = [0, 100 -X] instead of   0,100 G  ), and hence the buyer's preferences will become less altruistic. The buyer's willingness to pay to increase the seller's payoff is then smaller following the seller's investment than following non-investment. This leads to our conjecture that the premium price Z is smaller than p NI , the offer following non-investment.
The other axiom of the Revealed Altruism theory, Axiom S, states that the effect of Axiom R is stronger when a decision of an agent overturns the status quo (an act of commission) than when the decision upholds the status quo (an act of omission). Since investment could be considered an act of commission and non-investment an act of omission, Axiom S tells us that the seller's investment in MS increases the buyer's altruistic preferences more strongly than the seller's non-investment in the present paper does.
